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Could Some People Be Wronged by Suffering from Swine Flu? A Case 
Discussion on the Links between the Farm Animal Sector and Human 
Disease 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses the imaginary case of Gemma, presented initially at the 
International Swine Flu Conference (London, March 2010), to discuss 
whether a nurse who disagrees with most ways in which animals are farmed 
would be wronged if she contracted swine flu. It is argued that the farm 
animal sector has contributed to the emergence of H1N1 flu, and that the 
sector in general contributes significantly to the burden of human disease. 
The aim of this paper is to promote debate on the question whether a range of 
systems used by the farm animal sector survive moral scrutiny in light of 
these concerns.   
 
CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
In order to debate the issues raised by the ongoing swine flu pandemic, New-
Fields organised the International Swine Flu Conference, held in London on 
10-12 March 2010, an event that was attended by participants from a wide 
range of countries. In his keynote address with the title ‘What Are the Ethical 
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Issues Associated with Actual and Potential Flu Pandemics, and How Should 
We Resolve Them?’ the author of this paper used the following case to 
stimulate discussion: 
 
Gemma is a mother of three children who works as a nurse. She 
disagrees with most methods that are used to rear farm animals, 
partly on the basis of the view that they carry disproportionate 
risks for human health. In addition, she is a long-standing 
defender of animal rights. Gemma has now contracted swine flu 
and is faring poorly. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Delegates were then asked whether they thought that Gemma’s contraction of 
swine flu should be considered not only sad, but also bad. A show of hands 
revealed that almost all participants thought that it was just sad. The author 
then proceeded by arguing that there might be reasons to believe that it is also 
bad, i.e. that Gemma had been wronged by contracting swine flu. This paper 
is a more developed attempt to address why this might be so and to elicit 
discussion on this issue.   
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A first point that must be made is that the claim that Gemma has been 
wronged depends at least in part on the assumption that something could 
have been done to prevent Gemma from contracting swine flu. This 
assumption is contested by those who would consider the creation of a virus 
to be a natural process that is beyond human control. Provided humans do not 
set out to create a virus deliberately, there is some truth in this claim. 
However, it is also clear that humans might create the conditions that 
facilitate the development and spread of new viruses. In this respect, the 
argument has been made that the conditions in which many human beings 
keep farm animals facilitate the development of new viruses and their 
transmission within and between different species.[1] With regard to the 
recently emerged strain of H1N1 swine flu that caused a pandemic, it is 
beyond any reasonable doubt that human beings facilitated its emergence and 
transmission through farming pigs, even if there is considerable uncertainty 
with regard to the question of whether either extensive systems or intensive 
(or concentrated) farming systems are more directly implicated.[2] More 
generally, research has shown that about 60% of all known human pathogens 
are zoonotic, and that zoonoses account for about three quarters of recently 
emerged human pathogens.[3] One reason why zoonoses are increasing stems 
from the fact that the number of intensive systems to farm animals is growing 
quickly to feed the rapid increase in the consumption of farmed animal 
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products. Such systems provide rich havens for the emergence of new 
pathogens. This is so for a variety of reasons, including the facts that a large 
number of animals are crammed together in small spaces, live in unhygienic 
conditions, and enter into close contacts with farmers.[4] While it is not 
possible to say unequivocally that swine flu could not have emerged if the 
farm animal sector had not existed, it is nevertheless beyond reasonable 
doubt that the sector has facilitated the development of a wide range of 
zoonoses, including swine flu.[5] Had the farm animal sector not existed, it is 
highly likely that the H1N1 swine flu pandemic would not have occurred. 
Secondly, if something could have been done to prevent Gemma from 
contracting swine flu, the questions must be asked if it ought to have been 
done, and who should have done what. With regard to the latter question, it 
may not be easy to identify who the culprits are: Are they those who farm 
animals in general, or only those who farm particular animals in particular 
ways? Are they those who consume their products? Are they governments 
that have failed to pass appropriate health protection legislation? Even if it 
were possible to attribute responsibility to the moral agents involved, a 
remaining problem is that some might argue that the disadvantages of 
abandoning the relatively high-risk systems that are used by the farm animal 
sector are not outweighed by the benefits that such systems provide. In spite 
of their high risks, some might say that such systems provide more benefits 
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than the benefits that could be provided by other systems to produce human 
food. Alternatively, some might say that the systems used by the farm animal 
sector provide greater protection of certain rights, for example the right to 
adequate health protection,[6] or of central health capabilities,[7] than the 
protection that could be provided by other systems. A further possibility is 
that some might think that either the sector as a whole or particular systems 
fail to provide greater protection of certain rights, capabilities, or benefits 
compared to other systems that could be used to produce food, but that the 
difference is too small to justify ascribing moral culpability. For example, 
some might argue that Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (‘CAFOs’) 
provide animal products relatively cheaply to many who are living today, and 
that their interests in consuming those products are sufficiently great to 
tolerate the extra risks such systems might entail compared to other systems. 
Whereas this paper does not aim to settle this issue, but to raise 
further discussion of this point, there are reasons to believe that many 
systems used by the farm animal sector jeopardise human health in serious 
ways. Apart from contributing to zoonoses, the sector has also been 
associated with unsustainable land and water use, a disproportionate use of 
energy, and a disproportionate contribution to climate change.[8-14] While it 
is clear that not all systems that are used to farm animals raise challenges that 
are as profound as those associated with the intensive systems that are used 
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today, it has nevertheless been argued that, as the demand for farmed animal 
products is expected to double by 2050 relative to the production level in 
2000, ‘the environmental impact of livestock production will worsen 
dramatically … in the absence of major corrective features’.[15] To the 
extent that these impacts harm things that deserve protecting, for example 
people’s rights to adequate health protection,[6] or their central health 
capabilities,[7] it could therefore be argued that more ought to have been and 
to be done to avoid exposing Gemma and others to some of these harms. 
Options range from altering particular systems to abandoning the farming of 
animals altogether.[6,14] In relation to the available options, delegates at the 
conference were mainly concerned with intensive systems to farm animals, 
while some – in particular Mabel Mokoto, a delegate from Botswana – 
started questioning the farming of animals altogether. 
However, even if agreement could be reached that the farm animal 
sector ought to be altered from its present form, this need not imply that those 
who have already been harmed by the sector have been wronged. In order for 
someone to make a morally justified claim that they had been wronged, it 
would seem to be necessary that the risk of harm that materialised had not 
been accepted voluntarily or that they had not been sufficiently aware to 
assess the risks (either through a lack of capacity or through a lack of 
information). Let us imagine that Gemma lived near a nuclear power plant 
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and had been exposed to a high dosage of radiation after a nuclear accident. If 
Gemma had been aware of the risks involved with such plants and had 
embraced the risks voluntarily from the conviction that the benefits of having 
such plants outweigh their actual and potential disadvantages, it would be 
much more difficult for her to make a justified claim that she had been 
wronged. By analogy, in order for Gemma to have been wronged by 
contracting swine flu, any of the following conditions must be fulfilled: either 
Gemma might not have been informed adequately, or Gemma might have 
lacked sufficient mental capacity, or she was adequately informed and did not 
embrace the systems that are believed to have been causally implicated in her 
contracting the disease voluntarily. In reverse, someone with sufficient 
mental capacity who did support the farm animal sector in the totality of its 
present form could not make a justified claim that they had been wronged by 
contracting swine flu, at least not unless it could be argued that someone 
ought to have provided them with relevant information that might have 
altered their view. This conclusion is sound if the more general libertarian 
idea is accepted that moral agents cannot be held culpable for exposing others 
with sufficient mental capacity to harm if they chose to subject themselves to 
that harm voluntarily and whilst they were informed adequately about the 
risks involved.   
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It must also be recognised that Gemma might claim not only that she 
had been wronged by contracting swine flu, but also by the fact that she 
might have been and continue to be more vulnerable compared to other 
people. If Gemma has moral concerns about the farm animal industry, she 
might also have concerns with some of the ways in which the pharmaceutical 
industry develops flu vaccines and drugs. Many vaccines are developed by 
growing viruses inside developing chicken embryos, who are killed in the 
process (the prima facie wrongness of which has been argued elsewhere),[16] 
and many drugs are developed by experimenting on animals. Should 
Gemma’s commitment to protect animal rights imply that she opposes using 
such vaccines and drugs and if no suitable vaccines or drugs would be 
available that had been developed by alternative means, Gemma might argue 
that she is being wronged. If Gemma did not have access to what she 
considered to be an ethical alternative before she contracted the disease, for 
example a vaccine that was developed through cell culture, she might argue 
that she had been exposed to a disease for which an ethical vaccine ought to 
have been more widely available. For example, she might argue that her 
government had failed to protect her right to adequate health protection by 
failing to invest in the development or distribution of ethical vaccines. 
Similarly, should no therapeutic drugs be available that she considered to be 
ethical, she might argue that it was unfair for her to potentially suffer longer 
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compared to others affected by the disease on the basis of the claim that 
someone ought to have developed or provided drugs that she considered to be 
derived in an ethical fashion. Many delegates at the conference, however, 
expressed views in support of animal experimentation and the claim that the 
moral significance that chicken embryos might have was outweighed by the 
benefits that could be reaped from destroying them and was not significant 
enough to demand the use of alternative methods, and that Gemma could 
therefore not be wronged on this basis. In addition, some delegates at the 
conference expressed the view that Gemma had been immoral through her 
failure to take a vaccine prophylactically. The rationale provided in support 
of this claim was that, by refraining from doing so, she exposed her patients, 
as well as others, to an increased risk of contracting swine flu. If it had been 
relatively easy for Gemma to obtain a vaccine that had not been derived 
through methods that involved the killing of animals, the author of this paper 
would agree with this claim. If otherwise, this author would disagree, unless 
her refusal increased the risks to her patients so significantly that it ought to 
override the negative value this author associates with killing young 
chickens.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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The case identifies a clash of values that must be addressed in a discussion of 
the ethical issues associated with swine flu, and with zoonoses in general. 
Gemma objects to some aspects of the farm animal sector and might think 
that she has been wronged by others who support the farm animal sector in its 
present forms. Others might think that the farm animal sector is just fine – at 
least in the sense that those who support the sector did not fail in their duty to 
protect Gemma against the health problems that she now experiences – and 
that Gemma should have done more to protect others as well as herself 
against some of the risks that are associated with it. An alternative 
interpretation is that many people might actually agree that Gemma had been 
wronged, but that – for some reason or other – they fail to own up to this. In 
this vein, the novelist Jonathan Safran Foer has claimed – in the different 
context of discussing the ethical issues associated with the consumption of 
farmed animal products – that it is ‘odd’ that, while the values that underlie 
the views of those who refrain from eating animal products may be relatively 
‘uncontroversial’, those who act in accordance with them are often held to be  
‘marginal’.[17] If a similar interpretation can be adopted in relation to this 
case, the view that Gemma has been wronged might, after all, not be all that 
controversial. If this is correct, more work is needed to examine the gap 
between people’s theoretical concerns about the farm animal sector and the 
shape of that sector in reality. In earlier work I argued that the negative 
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‘GHIs’ (‘Global Health Impacts’) associated with the farm animal sector 
must be curtailed for a wide range of reasons apart from its contribution to 
the emergence and spread of zoonoses, and discussed a range of policies that 
could be developed.[6, 18] If the fact that Gemma has contracted swine flu is 
not just sad, but also bad, the case illustrates the imperative for the 
introduction of appropriate policies to transform the farm animal sector. 
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